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Abstract. Security protocols have been successfully analyzed using sym-
bolic models, where messages are represented by terms and protocols by
processes. Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability are typ-
ically expressed as equivalence between processes. While some decision
procedures have been proposed for automatically deciding process equiv-
alence, all existing approaches abstract away the information an attacker
may get when observing the length of messages.
In this paper, we study process equivalence with length tests. We first
show that, in the static case, almost all existing decidability results (for
static equivalence) can be extended to cope with length tests. In the ac-
tive case, we prove decidability of trace equivalence with length tests, for
a bounded number of sessions and for standard primitives. Our result
relies on a previous decidability result from Cheval et al [15] (without
length tests). Our procedure has been implemented and we have discov-
ered a new flaw against privacy in the biometric passport protocol.
1 Introduction
Privacy is an important concern in our today’s life where many documents and
transactions are digital. For example, we are usually carrying RFIDs cards (for
ground transportation, access to office buildings, for opening modern cars, etc.).
Due to these cards, malicious users may (attempt to) track us or learn more
about us. For instance, the biometric passport contains a chip that stores sen-
sitive information such as birth date, nationality, picture, fingerprints, and also
iris characteristics. In order to protect passport holders privacy, the application
(or protocol) deployed on biometric passports is designed to achieve authentica-
tion without revealing any information to a third party (data is sent encrypted).
However, it is well known that designing security protocols is error prone. For ex-
ample, it was possible to track French citizens due to an additional error message
introduced in French passports [5]. Symbolic models have been very successful
for analyzing security protocols. Several automatic tools have been designed such
as ProVerif [10], Avispa [6], etc.. They are very effective to detect flaws or prove
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security of many real-case studies (e.g JFK [2], OAuth2.0 [7], etc.). However,
these tools are, for most of them, dedicated to accessibility properties. While
data secrecy or authentication can be easily expressed as accessibility proper-
ties, privacy properties are instead stated as indistinguishability (or equivalence)
properties: Alice remains anonymous if an attacker cannot distinguish a session
with Alice as participant from a session with Bob as participant. The literature
on how to decide equivalence of security protocols is much less prolific than for
accessibility. Some procedures have been proposed [8,15,12,11] for some classes
of cryptographic primitives, not all procedures being guaranteed to terminate.
However, none of these results take into account the fact that an attacker can
always observe the length of a message. For example, even if k is a secret key, the
cyphertext {n}k corresponding to the encryption of a random number n by the
key k can always be distinguished from the cyphertext {n, n}k corresponding
to the encryption of a random number n repeated twice by the key k. This is
simply due to the fact that {n, n}k is longer than {n}k. These two messages
would be considered as indistinguishable in all previous mentioned symbolic ap-
proaches. The fact that encryption reveals the length of the underling plaintext
is a well-identified issue in cryptography. Therefore and not surprisingly, intro-
ducing a length function becomes necessary in symbolic models when proving
that symbolic process equivalence implies cryptographic indistinguishability [16].
Our contributions. In this paper, we consider an equivalence notion that takes
into account the information leaked by the length of a message. More precisely,
we equip the term algebra T with a length function ℓ : T 7→ R+ that associates
a non negative real number to any term and we let the attacker compare the
length of any two messages he can construct. As usual, the properties of the
cryptographic primitives are modeled through an equational theory. For example,
the equation sdec(senc(m, k), k) models the fact that decrypting with a key k a
message m (symmetrically) encrypted by k yields the message m in clear. The
goal of our paper is to study the decidability of equivalence with length tests.
The simplest case is the so-called static case, where an attacker can only ob-
serve protocol executions. Two sequences of messages are statically equivalent if
an attacker cannot see the difference between them. For example, the two mes-
sages {0}k and {1}k are distinct but cannot be distinguished by an attacker un-
less he knows the key k. We show how most existing decidability results for static
equivalence can be extended to length tests. We simply require the length func-
tion to be homomorphic, that is, the length ℓ(M) of a term M = f(M1, . . . ,Mk)
is a function of f and the lengths of M1, . . . ,Mk. We show that whenever static
equivalence is decidable for some equational theory E then static equivalence
remains decidable when adding length tests. The result requires a simple hy-
pothesis called SET-stability that is satisfied by most equational theories that
have been showed decidable for static equivalence. As an application, we deduce
decidability of static equivalence for many primitives, including symmetric and
asymmetric encryption, signatures, hash, blind signatures, exclusive or, etc.
The active case, where an attacker can freely interact with the protocol, is
of course more involved. Even without the introduction of a length function,
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there are very few decidability results [17,15]. Starting from the decision pro-
cedure developed in [15], we show how to deal with length functions for the
standard cryptographic primitives (symmetric and asymmetric encryption, sig-
natures, hash, and concatenation). Like for the static case, our result is actually
very modular. In order to check whether two protocols P and Q are in trace
equivalence with length tests, it is sufficient to first run the procedure of [15],
checking whether two protocols P and Q are in trace equivalence without length
tests. It is then sufficient to check for equalities of the polynomials we derive
from the processes that appear in the final states of the procedure of [15]. As
such, we provide a decision procedure for the two following problems: (1) Given
two processes P and Q and a length function ℓ, are P and Q in trace equiva-
lence with length tests (w.r.t. the length function ℓ)? (2) Given two processes
P and Q, does there exist a length function ℓ such that P and Q in not trace
equivalence with length tests (w.r.t. the length function ℓ)? From a practical
point of view, this amounts into deciding whether there exists an implementa-
tion of the primitives (that would meet some particular length property) such
that an attacker could distinguish between P and Q, leading to a privacy attack.
We have implemented our decision procedure for trace equivalence with length
tests as an extension of the APTE tool developped for [15]. As an application,
we study the biometric passport [1] and discover a new flaw. We show that an
attacker can break privacy by observing messages of different lengths depending
on which passport is used, therefore discovering who between Alice or Bob is
currently using her/his passport.
Related work. Existing decision procedures for trace equivalence do not con-
sider length tests. [15] shows that trace equivalence is decidable for finitely many
sessions and for a fixed term algebra (encryption, signatures, hash, . . . ). A pro-
cedure for a more flexible term algebra is provided in [12] but is not guaranteed
to terminate. Building on [8], it has been shown that trace equivalence can be
decided for any convergent subterm equational theories, for protocols with no
else branches [17]. The tool ProVerif [10,11] is also able to check for equiva-
lence but is again not guaranteed to terminate (and prove an equivalence that is
sometimes too strong). One of the only symbolic models that introduce a length
function is the model developed in [16] for proving that symbolic process equiv-
alence implies cryptographic indistinguishability. However, [16] does not discuss
any decision procedure for process equivalence.
2 Preliminaries
A key ingredient of formal models for security protocols is the representation of
messages by terms. This section is devoted to the definitions of terms and two
key notions of knowledge for the attacker: deduction and static equivalence.
2.1 Terms
Given a signature F (i.e. a finite set of function symbols, with a given arity),
an infinite set of names N , and an infinite set of variables X , the set of terms
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T (F ,N ,X ) is defined as the union of names N , variables X , and function sym-
bols of F applied to other terms. A term is said to be ground if it contains no
variable. n˜ denotes a set of names. The set of names of a term M is denoted by
fnames(M). Substitutions are replacement of variables by terms and are denoted
by θ = {M1/x1, . . . ,Mk/xk}. The application of a substitution θ to a term M
is defined as usual and is denoted Mθ. A context C is a term with holes. Given
terms M1, . . . ,Mk, the term C[M1, . . . ,Mk] may be denoted C[M˜i].
Example 1. A signature for modelling the standard cryptographic primitives
(symmetric and asymmetric encryption, concatenation, signatures, and hash)
is Fstand = Fc∪Fd where Fc and Fd are defined as follows (the second argument
being the arity):
Fc = {senc/2, aenc/2, pk/1, sign/2, vk/1, 〈 〉/2, h/1}
Fd = {sdec/2, adec/2, check/2, proj1/1, proj2/1}.
The function aenc (resp. senc) represents asymmetric encryption (resp. symmet-
ric encryption) with corresponding decryption function adec (resp. sdec) and
public key pk. Concatenation is represented by 〈 〉 with associated projectors
proj1 and proj2. Signature is modeled by the function sign with corresponding
validity check check and verification key vk. h represents the hash function.
The properties of the cryptographic primitives (e.g. decrypting an encrypted
message yields the message in clear) are expressed through equations. Formally,
we equip the term algebra with an equational theory, that is, an equivalence
relation on terms which is closed under substitutions for variables and names. We
write M =E N when the terms M and N are equivalent modulo E. Equational
theories can be used to specify a large variety of cryptographic primitives, from
the standard cryptographic primitives of Example 1 to exclusive or (XOR), blind
signatures, homomorphic encryption, trapdoor-commitment or Diffie-Hellman.
We provide below a theory for the standard primitives and for XOR. More
examples of equational theories can be found in [3,4].
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, the equational theory Estand for the standard
primitives is defined by the equations:
sdec(senc(x, y), y) = x (1)
adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x (2)
check(sign(x, y), vk(y)) = x (3)
proj1(〈x, y〉) = x (4)
proj2(〈x, y〉) = y (5)
Equation 1 models that decrypting an encrypted message senc(m, k) with
the right key k yields the message m in clear. Equation 2 is the asymmetric
analog of Equation 1. Similarly, Equations 4 and 5 model the first and second
projections for concatenation. There are various ways for modeling signature.
Here, Equation 3 models actually two properties. First, the validity of a signa-
ture sign(m, k) given the verification key vk(k) can be checked by applying the
test function check. Second, the underlying message m under signature can be
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retrieved (as it is often the case in symbolic models). This is because we assume
that a signature sign(m, k), which represents the digital signature itself, is always
sent together with the corresponding message m.
Example 3. The theory of XOR E⊕, is based on the signature Σ = {⊕/2, 0/0}
and the equations:
(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
x⊕ x = 0
x⊕ 0 = x
The two left equations model the fact that the function ⊕ is associative and
commutative. The right equations model the fact that XORing twice the same
element yields the neutral element 0.
A function symbol + is said to be AC (associative and commutative) if it
satisfies the two equations (x + y) + z = x + (y + z) and x + y = y + x. For
example, the symbol ⊕ is an AC-symbol of the theory E⊕. Given an equational
theory E, we write M =AC N if M and N are equal modulo the associativity
and commutativity of their AC-symbols.
2.2 Deduction and static equivalence
During protocol executions, the attacker learns sequences of messagesM1, . . . ,Mk
where some names are initially unknown to him. This is modeled by defining a
frame φ to be an expression of the form
φ = νn˜{M1/x1, . . . ,Mk/xk}
where n˜ is a set of names (representing the secret names) and the Mi are terms.
A frame is ground is all its terms are ground. The domain of the frame φ is
dom(φ) = {x1, . . . , xn}.
The first basic notion when modeling the attacker is the notion of deduction.
It captures what an attacker can built from a frame φ. Intuitively, the attacker
knows all the terms of φ and can apply any function to them.
Definition 1 (deduction). Given an equational theory E and a frame φ =
νn˜σ, a ground term N is deducible from φ, denoted φ ⊢ N , if there is a free
term M (i.e. fnames(M) ∩ n˜ = ∅), such that Mσ =E N . The term M is called
a recipe of N .
Example 4. Consider φ1 = νn, k, k
′{k/x1, senc(〈n, n〉, k)/x2, senc(n, k
′)/x3}. Then
φ1 ⊢ k, φ1 ⊢ n, but φ1 6⊢ k′. A recipe for k is x1 while a recipe for n is
proj1(sdec(x2, x1)). Another possible recipe of n is proj2(sdec(x2, x1)).
As mentioned in the introduction, the confidentiality of a vote v or the
anonymity of an agent a cannot be defined as the non deducibility of v or a.
Indeed, both are in general public values and are thus always deducible. Instead,
the standard approach consists in defining privacy based on an indistinguisha-
bility notion: an execution with a should indistinguishable from an execution
with b. Indistinguishability of sequences of terms is formally defined as static
equivalence.
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Definition 2 (static equivalence). Two frames φ1 = νn˜1σ1 and φ2 = νn˜2σ2
are statically equivalent, denoted φ1 ∼ φ2, if and only if for all terms M,N such
that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) = ∅,
(Mσ1 =E Nσ1)⇔ (Mσ2 =E Nσ2).
Example 5. Let φ2 = νn, n
′, k, k′{k/x1, senc(〈n
′, n〉, k)/x2, senc(n, k
′)/x3} and
φ3 = νn, k, k
′{k/x1, senc(〈n, n〉, k)/x2, senc(〈n, n〉, k
′)/x3}. φ1 is defined in Ex-
ample 4. Then φ1 6∼ φ2 since proj1(sdec(x2, x1)) = proj2(sdec(x2, x1)) is true in
φ1 but not in φ2. Intuitively, an attacker may distinguish between φ1 and φ2 by
decrypting the second message and noticing that the two components are equal
for φ1 while they differ for φ2. Conversely, we have φ1 ∼ φ3.
2.3 Rewrite systems
To decide deduction and static equivalence, it is often convenient to reason with
a rewrite system instead of an equational theory. A rewrite system R is a set of
rewrite rules l→ r (where l and r are terms) that is closed by substitution and
context. Formally a term u can be rewritten in v, denoted by u →R v if there
exists l → r ∈ R, a substitution θ, and a position p of u such that u|p = lθ and
v = u[rθ]p. The transitive and reflexive cloture of →R is denoted →∗R. We write
→ instead of →R when R is clear from the context.
Definition 3 (convergent). A rewrite system R is convergent if it is:
– terminating: there is no infinite sequence u1 → u2 → · · · → un → · · ·
– confluent: for every terms u, u1, u2 such that u → u1 and u → u2, there
exists v such that u1 →
∗ v and u2 →
∗ v.
For a convergent rewrite system, a term t has a unique normal form t↓ such that
t→∗ t↓ and t↓ has no successor.
An equational theory E is convergent if there exists a finite convergent rewrite
system R such that for any two terms u, v, we have u =E v if and only if u↓= v↓.
For example, the theory Estand defined in Example 2 is convergent. Its associ-
ated finite convergent rewrite system is obtained by orienting the equations from
left to right. Conversely, the theory E⊕ defined in Example 3 is not convergent
due the equations of associativity and commutativity. Since many equational
theories modeling cryptographic primitives do have associative and commuta-
tive symbols, we define rewriting modulo AC as M →AC N if there is a term
M ′ such that M =AC M
′ and M ′ → N . AC-convergence can then be defined
similarly to convergence.
Definition 4 (AC-convergent). A rewrite system R is AC-convergent if it is:
– AC-terminating: there is no infinite sequence u1 →AC · · · →AC un →AC · · ·
– AC-confluent: for every terms u, u1, u2 such that u→AC u1 and u→AC u2,
there exists v such that u1 →
∗
AC v and u2 →
∗
AC v.
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For a AC-convergent rewrite system, a term t has a unique set of normal forms
t↓AC= {t
′ | t→∗ t′ and t′ has no successor}. For any u, v ∈ t↓AC , u =AC v.
An equational theory E is AC-convergent if there exists a finite AC-convergent
rewrite system R such that for any two terms u, v, we have u =E v if and only
if u↓AC= v↓AC .
For example, the theory E⊕ defined Example 3 is AC-convergent. Its associ-
ated finite AC-convergent rewrite system is obtained by orienting the two right
equations from left to right. Of course, any convergent theory is AC-convergent.
Most, if not all, equational theories for cryptographic primitives are convergent
or at least AC-convergent. So in what follows, we only consider AC-convergent
theories.
3 Length equivalence - static case
While many decidability results have been provided for deduction and static
equivalence, for various theories, none of them study the leak induced by the
length of messages. In this section, we provide a definition for length functions
and we study how to extend existing decidability results to length functions.
3.1 Length function
A length function is simply a function ℓ : T (F ,N ,X )→ R+ that associates non-
negative real numbers to terms. A meaningful length function should associate
the same length to terms that are equal modulo the equational theory. Since
we consider AC-convergent theories, we assume that the length of a term t is
evaluated by an auxiliary function applied once t is in normal form. Moreover,
the size of a term f(M1, . . . ,Mk) is typically a function that depends on f and
the length of M1 . . . ,Mk. This class of length functions is called normalized
length functions.
Definition 5 (Normalized length function). Let T (F ,N ,X ) be a term al-
gebra and E be an AC-convergent equational theory. A length function ℓ is a
normalized length function if there exists a function ℓaux : T (F ,N ,X ) → R
+
(called auxiliary length function) such that the following properties hold:
1. ℓaux is a morphism, that is, for every function symbol f of arity k, there
exists a function ℓf : R
+k → R+ s.t. for all terms M1, . . . ,Mk
ℓaux(f(M1, . . . ,Mk)) = ℓf (ℓaux(M1), . . . , ℓaux(Mk))
2. ℓaux is stable modulo AC: ℓaux(M) = ℓaux(N) for all M,N s.t. M =AC N .
3. ℓaux decreases with rewriting: ℓaux(M) ≥ ℓaux(N) for allM,N s.t.M →AC N .
4. ℓ coincides with ℓaux on normal forms: ℓ(M) = ℓaux(M↓AC) where ℓaux(M↓AC)
is defined to be ℓaux(N) for any N ∈M↓AC .
5. For any r ∈ R+, the set {n ∈ N | ℓ(n) = r} is either infinite or empty. A
name should not be particularized by its length.
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Note that item 5 implies in particular that ℓaux(M) = ℓaux(Mσ) for any σ that
replaces the names of M by names of equal length (i.e. such that ℓaux(σ(n) =
ℓaux(n)). Indeed, the length should not depend of the choice of names.
Example 6. A natural length function for the standard primitives defined in
Example 2 is ℓstand induced by the following auxiliary length function ℓaux:
ℓaux(n) = 1 n ∈ N
ℓaux(senc(u, v)) = ℓaux(u) + ℓaux(v)
ℓaux(〈u, v〉)) = 1 + ℓaux(u) + ℓaux(v)
ℓaux(aenc(u, v)) = 2 + ℓaux(u) + ℓaux(v)
ℓaux(sign(u, v)) = 3 + ℓaux(u) + ℓaux(v)
ℓaux(f(u, v)) = 1 + ℓaux(u) + ℓaux(v) f ∈ {sdec, adec, check}
ℓaux(f(u)) = 1 + ℓaux(u) f ∈ {proj1, proj2}
Then the length of a term M is simply the auxiliary length of its normal form:
ℓ(M) = ℓaux(M↓) and ℓ is a normalized length function. Note that the constants
1, 2, 3 are rather arbitrary and ℓ would be a normalized length function for
any other choice. The choice of the exact parameters typically depends on the
implementation of the primitives.
Example 7. A length function for XOR is ℓ⊕, induced by the auxiliary func-
tion ℓaux defined by ℓaux(n) = 1 for n name, ℓaux(0) = 0, and ℓaux(u ⊕ v) =
max(ℓaux(u), ℓaux(v)). Then ℓ⊕ is again a normalized length function.
An attacker may compare the length of messages, which gives him addi-
tional power. For example, the frames φ1 and φ3 (defined in Example 5) are
statically equivalent. However, in reality, an attacker would notice that the
third messages are of different length. In particular, ℓstand(senc(n, k
′)) = 2 while
ℓstand(senc(〈n, n〉, k
′)) = 4 (where ℓstand has been defined in Example 6).
We extend the notion of static equivalence to take into account the ability
of an attacker to check for equality of lengths.
Definition 6 (static equivalence w.r.t. length). Two frames φ1 = νn˜1σ1
and φ2 = νn˜2σ2 are statically equivalent w.r.t. the length function ℓ, denoted
φ1 ∼
ℓ φ2, if φ1 and φ are statically equivalent (φ1 ∼ φ2) and for all terms M,N
such that (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) ∩ (n˜1 ∪ n˜2) = ∅,
(ℓ(Mσ1) =E ℓ(Nσ1))⇔ (ℓ(Mσ2) =E ℓ(Nσ2)).
3.2 Decidability
Ideally, we would like to inherit any decidability result that exists for the usual
static equivalence ∼. We actually need to look deeper in how decidability results
are obtained for ∼. In many approaches (e.g. [3,9]), decidability of static equiv-
alence is obtained by computing from a frame φ, an upper set that symbolically
describes the set of all deducible subterms. Here, we generalize this property into
SET-stability.
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Definition 7 (SET-stable). An equational theory E is SET-stable if for any
frame φ = νn˜{M1/x1, . . . ,Mk/xk} there exists a set SET(φ) such that:
– M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ SET(φ),
– ∀M ∈ SET(φ), φ ⊢M ,
– for any finite set of names n˜′ ⊇ n˜, for every context C1 such that fn(C1) ∩
n˜′ = ∅, for all N1i ∈ SET(φ), for all T ∈ (C1[N˜
1
i ]↓), there exist a context C2
such that fn(C2)∩ n˜′ = ∅ and terms N
2
i ∈ SET(φ) such that T =AC C2[N˜
2
i ].
We say that E is efficiently SET-stable if there is an algorithm that computes
the set SET(φ) being given a frame φ and that computes a recipe ζM for any
M ∈ SET(φ).
We are now ready to state our first main theorem.
Theorem 1. Let E be an efficiently SET-stable equational theory and ℓ be a
normalized length function. If ∼E is decidable then ∼
ℓ
E is decidable.
Sketch of proof The algorithm for checking for ∼ℓE works as follows. Given
two frames φ1 = νn˜σ1 and φ2 = νn˜σ2,
– check whether φ1 ∼E φ2
– compute SET(φ1) and SET(φ2);
– for any M ∈ SET(φ1), compute its corresponding recipe ζM and check
whether ℓ(ζMσ2) = ℓ(M);
– symmetrically, for any M ∈ SET(φ2), compute its corresponding recipe ζM
and check whether ℓ(ζMσ1) = ℓ(M);
– return true if all checks succeeded and false otherwise.
The algorithm returns true if φ1 ∼ℓE φ2. Indeed, for anyM ∈ SET(φ1), ℓ(ζMσ1) =
ℓ(M) = ℓ(M0) where M0 is length-preserving renaming of M↓ with free names
only. ℓ(ζMσ1) = ℓ(M0σ1) implies ℓ(ζMσ2) = ℓ(M0σ2) = ℓ(M0) = ℓ(M).
The converse implication is more involved and makes use of the properties
of the sets SET(φ1) and SET(φ2). 
Applying Theorem 1 we can deduce the decidability of ∼ℓE for any theory E
described in [3], e.g. theories for the standard primitives, for XOR, for pure AC,
for blind signatures, homomorphic encryption, addition, etc. More generally, we
can infer decidability for any locally stable theories, as defined in [3]. Intuitively,
locally-stability is similar to SET-stability except that only small contexts are
considered. Locally-stability is easier to check than SET-stability and has been
shown to imply SET-stability in [3].
Corollary 1. Let E be a locally-stable equational theory as defined in [3]. Let ℓ
be a normalized length function. If ∼E is decidable then ∼
ℓ
E is decidable.
4 Length equivalence - active case
We now study length equivalence in the active case, that is when an attacker
may fully interact with the protocol under study. We first define our process
algebra, in the spirit of the applied-pi calculus [4].
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4.1 Syntax
We consider Fd as defined in Example 1 and F
′
c ⊇ Fc. We let F
′
c contain more
primitives than Fc, to allow for constants or free primitives such as mac. We
consider the fixed equational theory Estand as defined in Example 2. Orienting
the equations of Estand from left to right yields a convergent rewrite system.
The constructor terms, resp. ground constructor terms, are those in T (F ′c,N∪
X ), resp. in T (F ′c,N ). A ground term u is called a message, denoted Message(u),
if v↓ is a constructor term for all v ∈ st(u). For instance, the terms sdec(a, b),
proj1(〈a, sdec(a, b)〉), and proj1(a) are not messages. Intuitively, we view terms as
modus operandi to compute bitstrings where we use the call-by-value evaluation
strategy.
The grammar of our plain processes is defined as follows:
P,Q := 0 | (P |Q) | P +Q | in(u, x).P | out(u, v).P | if u1 = u2 then P else Q
where u1, u2, u, v are terms, and x is a variable of X . Our calculus contains paral-
lel composition P | Q, choice P +Q, tests, input in(u, x).P , and output out(u, v).
Since we do not consider restriction, private names can simply be specified be-
fore hand so there is no need for name restriction. Trivial else branches may be
omitted.
Definition 8 (process). A process is a triple (E ;P;Φ) where:
– E is a set of names that represents the private names of P;
– Φ is a ground frame with domain included in AX . It represents the messages
available to the attacker;
– P is a multiset of closed plain processes.
4.2 Semantics
The semantics for processes is defined as usual. Due to space limitations, we only
provide two illustrative rules (see [13] or the appendix for the full definition).
(E ; {in(u, x).Q} ⊎ P;Φ)
in(N,M)
−−−−−−→ (E ; {Q{x 7→ t}} ⊎ P;Φ) (Inc)
if MΦ = t, fvars(M,N) ⊆ dom(Φ), fnames(M,N) ∩ E = ∅
NΦ↓ = u↓, Message(MΦ), Message(NΦ), and Message(u)
(E ; {out(u, t).Q} ⊎ P;Φ)
νaxn.out(M,axn)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (E ; {Q} ⊎ P;Φ ∪ {axn ⊲ t}) (Outc)
if MΦ↓ = u↓, Message(u), fvars(M) ⊆ dom(Φ), fnames(M) ∩ E = ∅
Message(MΦ), Message(t) and axn ∈ AX , n = |Φ|+ 1
where u, v, t are ground terms, and x is a variable. The
w
−→ relation is then
defined as usual as the reflexive and transitive closure of −→, where w is the
concatenation of all non silent actions.
The set of traces of a process A = (E ;P1;Φ1) is the set of the possible
sequences of actions together with the resulting frame.
trace(A) = {(s, νE .Φ2) | (E ;P1;Φ1)
s
⇒ (E ;P2;Φ2) for some P2, Φ2}
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4.3 Equivalence
Some terms such as sdec(〈a, b〉, k) or sdec(senc(a, k′), k) do not corresponding to
actual messages since the corresponding computation would typically fail and
return an error message. It would not make sense to compare the length of such
decoy messages. We therefore adapt the notion of static equivalence in order to
compare only lengths of terms that correspond to actual messages.
Definition 9. Let E a set of private names. Let Φ and Φ′ two frames. We say
that νE .Φ and νE .Φ′ are statically equivalent w.r.t. a length function ℓ, written
νE .Φ ∼ℓc νE .Φ
′, when dom(Φ) = dom(Φ′) and when for all terms M,N such that
fvars(M,N) ⊆ dom(Φ) and fnames(M,N) ∩ E = ∅, we have:
– Message(MΦ) if and only if Message(MΦ′)
– if Message(MΦ) and Message(NΦ) then
• MΦ↓ = NΦ↓ if and only MΦ′↓ = NΦ′↓; and
• ℓ(MΦ↓) = ℓ(NΦ↓) if and only if ℓ(MΦ′↓) = ℓ(NΦ′↓).
Two processes A and B are in trace equivalence if any sequence of actions of
A can be matched by the same sequence of actions in B such that the resulting
frames are statically equivalent.
Definition 10 (trace equivalence w.r.t. length ≈ℓ). Let A and B be pro-
cesses with the same set of private names E. A ⊑ℓ B if for every (s, νE .Φ) ∈
tracec(A), there exists (s, νE .Φ
′) ∈ trace(B) such that νE .Φ ∼ℓc νE .Φ
′.
Two closed processes A and B are trace equivalent w.r.t. the length function
ℓ, denoted by A ≈ℓ B, if A ⊑ℓ B and B ⊑ℓ A.
The length functions associated to standard primitives usually follow a simple
pattern (see e.g. Example 6). We focus on linear length functions, that have been
proved sound w.r.t. symbolic models [16]. A linear function is a function ℓ such





i xi for some α
f
1 , . . . , α
f
n, β
f ∈ R+. Moreover, we assume that hashed
messages are of fixed size: ℓ(h(t)) = ℓ(n) for any term t and name n. Finally, we
assume that the size of a pairing is at least the size of its arguments. Our second
main contribution is a decision procedure for trace equivalence w.r.t. length.
Theorem 2. Let ℓ be a linear length function. The problem of trace equivalence
w.r.t. ℓ is decidable.
Even if two processes are in trace equivalence for some length function, they
may not be in trace equivalence for another one. Choosing the appropriate length
function may be tricky since the “right” parameters depend on the implementa-
tion of the primitives. We can actually decide a stronger problem: the existence
of a length function that would compromise trace equivalence.
Theorem 3. The following problem is decidable:
Entry: two closed processes A and B
Question: does there exist a linear length function ℓ such that A 6≈ℓ B?
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For both theorems, the decision procedure builds upon the decision proce-
dure developed in [15] for trace equivalence (without length). Given two closed
processes A and B, our procedure roughly works as follows.
1. We first apply the procedure of [15] to A and B.
2. If A 6≈ B (A and B are not in trace equivalence) then clearly A 6≈ℓ B for any
length function ℓ.
3. Otherwise, if A ≈ B, we look deeper at the output of the procedure of [15]. It
ends up with two trees (one for each process), which leaves are sets of “constraint
systems” C that define a parametrized frame Φ(C). We can associate polynomials
to each frame as follows. Given a term u with parameters param(u), we define
its associated polynomial Pu ∈ Z[param(u)] by Pn = ℓ(n) for n a name, Px = x
for x a parameter and Pf(u1,...,uk) = ℓf (Pu1 , . . . , Puk) otherwise.
Then the sequence of polynomials associated to a frame
Φ = {ξ1 ⊲ u1, . . . , ξn ⊲ un} is PΦ = Pu1 , . . . , Pun .
We can show that A ≈ℓ B if and only if, for any set Σ1 of constraint system
that appears as leaf in the tree associated to A, its corresponding set Σ2 of
constraint system in the tree associated to B is such that
{PΦ(C) | C ∈ Σ1} = {PΦ(C) | C ∈ Σ2}.
Therefore, checking for trace equivalence for a particular linear length function ℓ
(Theorem 2) amounts into checking for equality of sets of polynomials. Check-
ing whether there exists a linear length function ℓ such that an attacker can
distinguish between A and B (Theorem 3) amounts into checking for equality of
sets of parametrized polynomials, which in turn amounts again into checking for
equality of polynomials (since the coefficients of the parametrized polynomials
are also polynomials).
Our procedure could be easily extended to non linear length functions, pro-
vided that we can solve the corresponding algebraic problem, that is equality of
the zeros of the Pu’s, when they are not polynomials anymore.
5 Passport
The biometric passport contains an RFID chip that stores sensitive authen-
tication information such as birth date, nationality, picture, fingerprints, and
also iris characteristics. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
standard specifies the communication protocols that are used to access these
information [1]. We have discovered a new attack on anonymity, as soon as the
size of the pictures may vary from one user to another one.
5.1 Description of the Passive Authentication protocol
According to the ICAO standard, a reader (e.g. officer at the border) and a
passport first establishes key sessions (denoted ksenc and ksmac) through the
Basic Access Control protocol. Once such keys are successfully established, the
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Passport Tag
ksenc, ksmac, dg , sod
Reader
ksenc, ksmac
xenc ← senc(read, ksenc)
xmac ← mac(xenc, ksmac)
〈xenc, xmac〉
Verify mac and read
yenc ← senc(〈dg , sod〉, ksenc)
ymac ← mac(yenc, ksmac)
〈yenc, ymac〉
Fig. 1. Passive Authentication protocol (PA)
Passive Authentication protocol (Figure 1) is executed along with other proto-
cols. It establishes a secure communication between the reader and the passport,
which sends the (sensitive) authentication information such as the name, date
of birth, nationality, and pictures. This information is organised in data groups
(dg1 to dg19). In particular, dg5 contains the JPEG picture of the passport’s
holder. The standard specifies that JPEG pictures are of size 0 to 99999 bytes.
The Passive Authentication protocol works as follows. (1) The reader sends
an authentication query, sending a pre-defined public value read, encrypted by
the session key ksenc and MACed by the session MAC key ksmac. This ensures
that the request comes from a legitimate reader. (2) The passport sends back
the authentication information dg (from dg1 to dg19) together with a certificate
sod
def
= sign(dg , skDS ), encrypted under the encryption key ksenc and MACed
under ksmac. The certificate sod ensures the validity of the information.
5.2 Formal specification of the protocol
The formal specification of the Passive Authentication protocol is displayed in
Figure 2. The process PA(dg , ℓ) represents a session of the passive authentication
protocol, where Pass and Reader represent respectively the Passport Tag and
the Reader. The key ksenc and ksmac are fresh names shared only by Pass and
Reader since they are session keys previously established by the Basic Access
Control protocol.
5.3 Unlinkability
The ICAO standard specifies that biometric passport must ensure unlinkability,
i.e. must ensure that a user may make multiple uses of a service or a resource
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(x) = senc(read, ksenc) then






= let xenc = senc(read, ksenc) in
out(c, 〈xenc,mac(xenc, ksmac)〉).in(c, x).
if mac(proj
1
(x), ksmac) = proj
2
(x) then





(y), vk(skDS )) = proj1(y) then 0
PA(dg)
def
= νksenc.νksmac.(Pass(dg , ksenc, ksmac) | Reader(ksenc, ksmac))
Fig. 2. Formal specification of the Passive Authentication Protocol.
without others being able to link these uses together. The unlinkability of the
Passive Authentication protocol can be formalised by the following equivalence:
νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg1) ≈
ℓ νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg2))
where dg1, dg2 are the respective data groups of two passport. Intuitively, a user
is unlinkable if an attacker cannot distinguish two sessions where the same user
is present from two sessions where two different users are present.
Attack. Intuitively, the attack works as follows. We assume that the attacker
first listens to an honest session between a reader and a passport A under attack.
It therefore learns the size of the encryption of the data groups. Now, listening
to any session between a reader and a passport B, it can compare the size of the
encryption of the data groups. with the previous one. If they differ, A cannot be
present, that is B 6= A. If they are equal, then B is likely to be A. How likely
depends on the variability of the length and the size of the group of passport
holders the attacker wish to distinguish from. Formally, this attack shows that
νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg1) 6≈
ℓ νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg2)).
Impact. Our attack is very simple: a small device placed near a reader may
very quickly decides whether A is present or not, simply listening to the mes-
sages received by the reader. [5] also describes an attack against unlinkability. It
is based on the Basic Access Control protocol and relies on the fact that differ-
ent error codes were used in the implementation of the French passports. The
attack is dedicated to French passports and has now been fixed. Another attack
demonstrated by A. Laurie consists in brute-forcing the document numbers of
the passport (which normally requires to open and read the first page of the
passport). Once the document numbers are known, anyone can access the data
groups. In contrast, our attack does not require any access to these numbers and
is inherent to the variability of the size of identifying objects such as pictures.
Fixes. The only simple fix is to ensure that data groups are of fixed size, typi-
cally by padding and/or restricting the range of size of data groups. However, this
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would result in heavier exchanges. Alternatively, a solution is to add padding of
random size (which size varies at each transaction). The attacker would still gain
some information on the probable user’s identity but with smaller probability.
5.4 Implementation of the decision procedure
We have implemented our decision procedure in the active case (for the stan-
dard primitives) as an extension of the APTE tool [14]. Thanks to our tool,
we can prove our fix (with padding) secure. Consider two data groups dg ′1,




2)). Using APTE, we show that padding








PA(dg ′2)). We can also show that our attack relies solely on the ability to compare
lengths. Indeed, using APTE again, we can show that PA guarantees unlinka-
bility for trace equivalence without length, that is νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg1) ≈
νskDS .(PA(dg1) | PA(dg2)).
The following table summarises our findings using APTE on a 2.4 Ghz Intel
Core 2 Duo. The input file used can be found in [14].
Unlinkability Time
PA w.r.t. ≈ true 4.42 sec
PA w.r.t. ≈ℓ false 0.01 sec
PA with padding w.r.t. ≈ true 4.44 sec
PA with padding w.r.t. ≈ℓ true 4.36 sec
6 Conclusion
We have proposed the first decision procedure for behavioral equivalence in pres-
ence of a length function. This allows e.g. to check for privacy properties more
accurately. In the passive case, we have shown how to extend existing decid-
ability results to a length function, for large classes of equational theories. In
the active case, we provide a decision procedure for the standard primitives. Its
implementation is an extension of the APTE tool [14]. As an application, we
have discovered a new privacy flaw in the biometric passport. As future work,
we plan to implement our attack and test it on several passports.
In this paper, we have focused on linear length functions since linear length
functions can be realized for standard primitives and proved sound w.r.t. a cryp-
tographic model [16]. We plan to investigate other families of length functions
that are relevant for cryptographic primitives. In case some of these functions
are not linear, we may need to revisit our procedure.
Protocols may sometimes perform length tests as well, for example, an agent
may check that some data does not exceed a certain length. We believe that
our procedure can be adapted in case length tests appear in the control flow
of the protocols. It would require to extend the constraint systems used in the
procedure in order to store constraints on the length. Adapting the decision
procedure to solve these additional constraints might be challenging and raise
difficult termination problems.
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Our length function may also be used to capture other kind of leakages
such as computation time or power consumption. To detect such side-channel
attacks, we would need to model the “length” (or computation time / power
consumption) of tests performed in the protocol. We plan to study whether our
procedure can be extended to the case where protocols not only leak the length
of output terms but also the “length” of performed tests.
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